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ARTICLE
FITTING LYING TO THE COURT INTO
THE CENTRAL MORAL TRADITION OF
LAWYERING
Fred C. Zachariast
A wise man once said that "the whole point of applied ethics is to
see where we stand and how we might act in the real world ... we
have yet to get the paradigm straight."1 In discussing Lord
Brougham's paradigm, which many people consider the core of the
adversary system-that "An advocate, in the discharge of his duty,
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client" 2-the same wise man reached this conclusion: "Lord
Brougham... uttered hyperbolic nonsense."3
For this scholar, the real question for practicing lawyers and
students of law was:
How should the lawyer behave given that particular role as
'champion' within the context and confines of the adversary
system of justice? In other words, what means are appropriate
to ends that often seem, and indeed often are, inconsistent
t Herzog Endowed Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. The
author thanks Bruce Green, Steven D. Smith, and Sharon Zacharias for their helpful comments
and Tatanya Livshits for her research assistance.
1 Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311,
312-13 (1990).
2 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, Albion Press 1821).
3 Lawry, supra note l,at 319.
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with justice or good morals as those terms are generally
understood by the average good and reasonable citizen.4
The wise man whom I have quoted is Professor Robert Lawry, the
honoree of today's public lecture.5 He expressed these points of view
in an important article in 1990 entitled The Central Moral Tradition
of Lawyering.6 Professor Lawry understood that being a lawyer-
being a good and upstanding lawyer-is difficult business. Having a
little bit of the philosopher in him, Professor Lawry resisted the
proposition that lawyers' moral dilemmas can be resolved uniformly
by resort to a simple formula, like Lord Brougham's prescription.
That is a lesson Professor Lawry helped teach me, and it is one that
has been prominent in my own writings.7 I thank him for that.
What I would like to do today, in Professor Lawry's honor, is to
spell the complication out a bit, to move closer to "getting the
paradigm right"-or rather to getting the paradigms right.8 I will
suggest that unitary or single-minded approaches to legal ethics
simply cannot and do not provide all the answers.
Let me start by introducing the issue with a bit of background for
the uninitiated. The professional responsibility world divides itself
into three camps. 9 Some scholars adhere to the ultra-adversarial norm
proposed by Lord Brougham and sponsored most fiercely in modem
times by Monroe Freedman.' 0 For them, the adversarial ethic governs
4 Id at 320.
5 This lecture was presented as the Robert P. Lawry Lecture in Legal Ethics at the Case
Western University Law School on September 26, 2007, in honor of the retirement of Professor
Lawry.
6 Lawry, supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REv. 265, 278-91 (2006) (discussing varying interpretations that can be
ascribed to permissive ethics rules); Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of
Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44
ARIz. L. REv. 829, 838-63 (2002) (discussing ways legal ethics regulation oversimplifies).
8 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73
(2007) (describing a series of images, or paradigms, of lawyers that all underlie legal ethics
regulation).
9 See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 (2005) (identifying two sides in the debate over advocacy ethics and
suggesting that a third view exists); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 363, 367 (2004) (describing one view as arguing "that a lawyer should always act on the
balance of first-order moral reasons" and the other as arguing "that a lawyer is prohibited from
taking into account certain ordinary first-order moral reasons because of some feature of the
lawyer's role, such as the obligations of partisanship and neutrality.").
1o See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
72 (3d ed. 2004) (adopting the Brougham view); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REv. 339, 342 (1994)
(arguing against modem ethics rules limiting partisanship and asserting that these rules are
"[d]rafted by attorneys who are frequently insensitive to the dynamics of the adversarial
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everything else. Lawyers must abide by the law and codes of ethics-
which provide some rules for the adversarial game."1 But even these
rules should be read and interpreted in light of, and as furthering, a
lawyer's overriding obligation to serve his client's interests.
1 2
At the other extreme is a camp that assumes legal ethics regulation
implements the Brougham-Freedman approach-which scholars in
this camp call "the Dominant View" of legal ethics.1 3 These scholars
question the appropriateness of the Dominant View. The camp's
adherents, originating with David Hoffman in the 1800's and led by
David Luban and William Simon today, distrust justifications for
lawyer conduct based on the adversary system.t 4 They suggest, in
differing ways, that lawyers should exercise broad moral discretion
that trumps norms of role-differentiated behavior.
The third camp, into which I and others fall, suggests that the
world is more complicated than that. We accept the existence and
benefits of the adversary system but argue that, in practice, the
American legal system is not as one-dimensional as Freedman claims
or the other camp assumes.15 Ted Schneyer, in a seminal article in the
Wisconsin Law Review, illustrated the indisputable point that the
process.").
11 Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319,
1323 (2006) ("no one-not Brougham nor anyone else-has ever suggested that zealous
advocacy is not limited by duties imposed by law.").
12 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 774
(2006) (quoting the scope section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for the
proposition that the ethics codes are "rules of reason" that should be interpreted "with reference
to the purposes of legal representation and the law itself.").
13 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER'S
ETHICS 8 (1998) (identifying a "dominant view" of legal ethics); see also DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xix-xxi (1988) (positing a "standard conception of
the lawyer's role").
4 See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 85-105 (David Luban ed., 1984) (questioning the
force of adversarial justifications for some types of ultra-aggressive lawyer conduct); William
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988) (arguing that
"[t]he lawyer should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the
particular case, seem most likely to promote justice."); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 67 (2000) (arguing that lawyers
"cannot simply rely on some idealized model of adversarial and legislative processes" and that
"reference to broader moral principles is necessary.").
15 See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1543 (arguing that the "Standard Conception is really only one, and
never a completely dominant, strand of thought in a vague and sometimes contradictory field");
Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1991) (arguing that
adversarial ethics envisions moral legal practice); Zacharias & Green, supra note 9, at 44-56
(challenging the traditional views of advocacy ethics); see also Lawry, supra note I (identifying
a tradition of lawyering that is inconsistent with uniform partisanship).
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modem legal ethics codes-which set the boundaries for the
system-already allow lawyers to exercise a significant measure of
moral discretion.' 6 Bruce Green and I, in an article published last
year, have tried to show that, historically, there always has been a
give and take between legal ethics regulation and judicial regulation
of lawyers which has produced a standard for advocacy that accepts
neither the Brougham-Freedman nor the Hoffman-Luban view.
17
Rather, there is a middle-ground based on professional norms,
understandings, and conscience that limit lawyers' unquestioning
adherence to client interests while still incorporating the basic
elements of role-differentiation.'
8
That is the starting point. So let us move from there to Professor
Freedman's most recent illustration of how he believes legal ethics
should work. For all my disagreements with him' 9-- which
incidentally are probably not as significant as Freedman himself
believes 20 -I have to admit that Professor Freedman is always
provocative. His latest paper has made me think. I hope you too will
enjoy contemplating his claims.
This is Freedman's question: should lawyers ever intentionally lie
to a court?21 Such lies are absolutely forbidden by all professional
codes. 22 Most judges and lawyers would be horrified by the notion
that the prohibition is defeasible. Yet Professor Freedman concludes
that "there are circumstances in which zealous representation ... can
require a lawyer to make a false statement to a court or to a third
16 Schneyer, supra note 15, at 1544-50.
17 Zacharias & Green, supra note 9, at 36-65.
18 Id. at 57 (arguing that there are areas of professional conscience that the codes
recognize and in which they expect discretion to be exercised non-idiosyncratically).
19 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional
Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 170-172 (1996) (questioning the paradigm
underlying the professional codes of the unsophisticated defendant requiring an ultra-aggressive
advocate); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351 (1989)
(empirical study questioning the assumptions underlying extremely strict attorney-client
confidentiality rules).
28 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Five Lessons for Practicing Law In the Interests of Justice,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2002) ("When one practices in an adversarial system--and I
have no expectation that America will scrap the adversarial system anytime in the near future-
I think that one has to accept most of Monroe Freedman's premises."); Fred C. Zacharias,
Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303, 1319-20
(1995) (describing the importance of Freedman's work in the development of American legal
practice and the regulation of lawyers).
21 Freedman, supra note 12, at 772 (arguing that circumstances exist in which a lawyer
should "make a false statement to a court").
22 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not
knowingly ... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal"); see also id. R. 8.4 ("It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.").
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person, or to engage in other conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. 23
Here is Freedman's most interesting illustration, and the one I
want to focus on. Suppose a judge routinely calls criminal defense
attorneys to the bench prior to trial and says "Let's move this along.
Did he do it or didn't he?,
24
Obviously, this puts the lawyer in a terrible position. If the
lawyer's client is guilty and the lawyer says so, he breaches
confidentiality and undermines his client's interests. If the client is
innocent, and the lawyer declines to say so with a comment like "I
can't answer that question," the judge may assume the client is guilty
and hold it against the client. Freedman's answer is that the judge has
acted improperly-a proposition with which we probably all can
agree-and that therefore the lawyer is justified in always answering
"I have no doubt that my client is not guilty," even if the opposite is
true.
25
As I started thinking about Professor Freedman's hypothetical, my
initial reaction to his conclusion was sympathetic. After all, lawyers
ordinarily should not act against their clients' interests, especially in
situations in which their very function is to act as an advocate.
Confidentiality rules are designed to allow clients to give their
lawyers information about their guilt or innocence with the assurance
that the lawyers will not reveal it.
26
But then I started considering the ramifications of Freedman's
conclusion. Suppose the lawyer tells this judge that his guilty client is
innocent, and always acts this way. When the question is later asked
about an innocent client, the lawyer's word will mean much less. In
effect, the lawyer has thrown one set of clients under the bus for
another.
23 Freedman, supra note 12, at 772.
24 Id. at 773.
25 Id. Freedman suggests that this double negative-denying doubt that the "client is not
guilty"-is less of a lie than saying the "client is innocent" because the client is cloaked with the
presumption of innocence. Id. at 777. That distinction seems meaningless, unless the wording is
designed to alert, and has the effect of alerting, the judge to the fact that the lawyer is providing
a non-responsive answer. Interpreting the response that way, however, robs Freedman's
hypothetical of its force and the very point about client-orientation that Freedman tries to make.
So interpreted, the response would be close to the more candid but equally non-responsive
answer that I propose below. If, in contrast, the response is designed to serve the client-oriented
function that Freedman champions, then it is intended to mislead the court and is tantamount to
falsely asserting the client's innocence.
26 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6 cmt. ("[Confidentiality] contributes to the
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to
seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.").
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That, of course, is not a new conundrum. What should a lawyer do
when a prosecutor offers plea deals for two clients-one of which is
very favorable, the other of which is unfavorable-and makes them
contingent on both clients accepting the offers? Or-and this is
something I frequently did as a defense attorney-should a lawyer
whose word is considered trustworthy go to a prosecutor or
sentencing judge and volunteer his personal view that a client is a
good risk for a particular type of diversion or probation? Like in
Freedman's hypothetical, the failure to do the same for a less
appealing client suggests to the prosecutor or the court that the client
is unworthy. Conversely, making the same type of appeal for all
clients leads prosecutors and the court to distrust the lawyer's word,
even when the client deserves the benefit of the doubt.
Lord Brougham and Professor Freedman probably would say that
the lawyer must always do what is best for the client, acting in the
moment in which the lawyer represents that client. But let me hearken
back to our wise man, Professor Lawry. He has suggested that "there
is no such thing as a 'client' without a legal system within which the
words 'lawyer' and 'client' have meaning., 27 When Lord Brougham
said a lawyer must know no person other than his client, he assumed
that the lawyer has but one client, while in fact most lawyers have
many clients and must serve all of those clients in the context of a
continuing legal system. Brougham also assumed that the legal
system in which representation occurs allows a lawyer to act in the
prescribed way-that it does not assume, anticipate, or require
representation that incorporates process-based or "officer of the
court" limits on the lawyer's behavior, including speaking the truth or
making sure that the system works appropriately.
28
Professor Freedman's response to the hypothetical is unsatisfying
for similar reasons. His response is based almost entirely on this
axiom: "For more than a century, the lawyer's ethic of zeal has
required, and has inspired, entire devotion to the . . . client ... .
27 Lawry, supra note 1, at 319.
28 In his autobiography, Brougham subtly amended the paradigm in his famous quotation,
stating that the lawyer's obligation to his client "is the highest and most unquestioned of his
duties," rather than his "first and only duty." 2 HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, TIHE LIFE AND TIMES
OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, WRiTrEN BY HIMSELF 308-09 (William Blackwood and Sons,
Edinburgh and London 1871). If intentional, this change may have reflected a new (or newly-
acknowledged) appreciation for the systemic constraints on lawyers that limit unfettered
advocacy. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Anything Other than a Deliberate and
Well-Considered Opinion-Henry Lord Brougham, Written By Himself, 19 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHicS 1221, 1224 (2006) (discussing the possibility that Lord Brougham may have
reconsidered his paradigm late in life).
29 Freedman, supra note 12, at 771 (emphasis added).
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Given this unitary and tautological description of the lawyer's ethic,
Freedman has no problem concluding that the lie to the court is "The
response ... that is consistent with zeal, confidentiality, competence,
and the Fifth Amendment [privilege against self-incrimination]. 3 °
The lawyer cannot "lead the client to believe that she is 'acting solely
in [the client's] interests" and then, in response to a judge's question,
become essentially 'an agent of the State .... While Freedman
correctly notes, as many scholars in many fields have noted, that there
are degrees of lying and that sometimes shading the truth can be
morally justified,32 virtually his only support for the notion that in this
case the lawyer's lie is "morally justifiable equivocation" is the
lawyer's supposed role as an advocate and the fact that the court has
acted wrongfully.
33
Freedman fails to discuss why the ethics codes include strict
prohibitions against lying. He assumes the prohibitions to be
secondary to Brougham's single ethic of devotion to the client. That
may not be correct, either as a descriptive or prescriptive matter.
First, no ethics code ever has adopted Brougham's proposition as
the definition of a lawyer's role. The codes regulate lawyers in all
their functions-not just their functions as trial advocates in criminal
cases. However strong the justifications for Brougham-like advocacy
might be in that one context, for lawyers who serve as advisors,
counselors, negotiators, and facilitators of cooperative ventures, the
ethic often seems out of place.34
More to the point is the fact that, from the 1908 Canons of Ethics
forward, the legal ethics codes have always advised lawyers that they
sometimes do need to know persons other than their client-for
example, in refraining from suborning perjury. The reason the early
codes recognized alternative interests was that, historically, the codes
took their cues from judicial regulation of lawyers. Judges universally
perceived the function of lawyers as helping courts identify the
30 Id. at 773 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 774 (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981)).
32 Id. at 776-77; see generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE xvii-xviii (1978) ("reasons to lie occur to most people quite often"); Arnold
Isenberg, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, in ETHICS 163, 183 (Judith J. Thomson & Gerald
Dworkin eds., 1968) (discussing the inherent wrongness of lying in the context of a person who
lures a child from the edge of a cliff by falsely stating that he has candy to give to the child);
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 227 (Louis Infield trans., 1978) (noting circumstances
in which false speech should not be considered to be lying).
33 Freedman, supra note 12, at 777.
34 See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 81 (noting that the adversarial paradigm "ignor[es] the
reality that some representation takes place in the absence of a contest or an adversarial
arbitration process.").
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truth.35 Over time, as the philosophical debate about the adversary
system matured, the professional codes became more important in the
setting of rules for lawyers, but the connection between professional
and judicial regulation continues today.36 Never once has the package
of ethics regulation explicitly or implicitly adopted the unitary view
of the lawyer's role that Freedman claims is overriding. As John
Adams once said, "facts are stubborn things. 37
The codes actually recognize several roles for lawyers other than
being clients' champions. The most obvious alternative is the role as
officer of the court which, again, stems from the long tradition of
judicial regulation of lawyers.38 We have already noted that lawyers
are not supposed to lie to the court, but there are many other duties
stemming from this role-a number of which are directly
contradictory to serving the client's interests. The lawyer may not
introduce false evidence. 39 He must advise a court of controlling
precedent.40 He may not make frivolous claims.4 1 He must obey
discovery rules.42 The list goes on.43
There is another role, which one could consider either part of the
officer-of-the-court function or a separate role, to make sure the legal
system operates in its intended fashion. This obligation may be more
significant for prosecutors than defense attorneys,44  but private
lawyers share the obligation as well. A lawyer may not communicate
35 Zacharias & Green, supra note 9, at 37.
36 Id. at 60-64 (discussing the continuing relationship between professional and judicial
regulation).
37 The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/3235/html (last visited
Sept. 7, 2007) (quoting John Adams, Argument in Defense of the Soldiers in the Boston
Massacre Trials (Dec. 1770)).
" The officer-of-the-court notion often is downplayed in the literature because it seems
like a fuzzy term that might be used haphazardly to undermine the advocate's function. The
term disappeared in the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, but reappeared in the
1983 Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (1983) ("A lawyer... is an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) (omitting the term "officer of the
court"). The concept actually encompasses very concrete duties, some of which are noted above.
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
40 Id. R. 3.3(a)(2).
41 Id. R. 3.1.
42 See id, R. 3.4(c)-(d).
41 Consistent with his approach of interpreting the codes through the lens of Brougham's
paradigm, Professor Freedman suggests that "in a free society the lawyer's function, as an
officer of the court, is to serve the undivided interests of the individual client." FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note 10, at 10. That account of the officer-of-the-court role, however, does not
comport with the specific obligations contained in the professional codes or those historically
imposed by judicial regulators.
44 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND L. REV. 45, 85-102 (1991) (arguing that prosecutors have a
special obligation to ensure that the criminal justice system is operating in its intended fashion).
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with a represented party,4 5 thus preserving the adversary's ability to
use her lawyer as the system envisions. A lawyer may need to inform
the opposing lawyer of inadvertently disclosed documents,46 so that
the opponent can raise possible legal claims to get the documents
back.47 Under the old Code of Professional Responsibility, the lawyer
must advise the court of even an opposing witness's perjury,48 so that
the judge can address the problem and the system can operate on the
basis of truthful testimony. It is impossible to reconcile these
obligations with the Brougham model, because they require lawyers
to act specifically to preserve the interests of third parties in a
properly functioning legal process. The lawyer must know someone
other than his client.
Professor Lawry has suggested that "the lawyer'sfirst obligation is
to the system of law itself, its processes, procedures and
institutions. ' 49 For Lawry, "if the primary duty of the lawyer is to the
processes, procedures, and institutions of the law, the lawyer is the
client's 'champion' only within that realm and only in ways the laws,
social mores, and moral traditions of lawyering within that realm
allow." 50 I do not know whether I agree that the obligation to the
institutions of law is the lawyer's first obligation, but it clearly is one
of the functions which legal ethics-particularly that part of legal
ethics stemming from judicial regulation-has always recognized and
emphasized. Professor Lawry is at least correct in concluding that, if a
lawyer "truly [is] an officer of the law.., until we say clearly what
we expect from the various officers of the law, we invite ... chaos. 51
So there is the first questionable aspect of Freedman's position on
the lying lawyer: the notion that there is a single role for lawyers. In
fact, there are several. They are not always consistent. There is
nothing in the codes, nor in any uncontroversial principle, that allows
us to assume Freedman's position that the champion's role controls in
the event of a conflict.
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.4.2 (1983).
46 This obligation is codified for the first time in the new Model Rules. Id. R. 4.4(b).
47 Professor Freedman challenges this obligation, again based on the theory that devotion
to a client overrides the duty to preserve the system. Monroe H. Freedman, Erroneous
Disclosure of Damaging Information: A Response to Professor Andrew Perlman, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 179, 181-82 (2006) ("if the client's decision is to use the information to its
greatest effect, the lawyer should not say anything about the information to the other side until it
is tactically desirable to do so (e.g., at a deposition or on cross-examination).").
48 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(b) (1969).
49 Lawry, supra note 1, at 335 (emphasis added).
'o Id. at 320-21.
"' Id. at 326.
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A second, partially-connected consideration is the fact that the
requirement that lawyers tell the truth-in court and elsewhere-
serves an important value that would be diminished if lawyers
routinely lied in Freedman's hypothetical. Namely, truth-telling by
lawyers is economically and administratively efficient. It would be
possible to develop a legal system in which everyone assumes that
lawyers always lie in their clients' interests-in court, in negotiations,
in conversation. The ramification of that system would be caveat
emptor--distrust lawyers at all times. Check the facts, obtain full
discovery before settling, and be prepared to challenge every
statement the adversary makes!
A legal world based on such a regime seems frightening. The
inefficiencies inherent in that world are part of the reason courts and
code drafters have insisted that lawyers always be candid. Lawyers
may avoid answering some questions. They may draw inferences
from the facts. They even may engage in puffing in negotiations. But
when a lawyer speaks, we want to be able to rely on his word.
That is why, when I used to assure prosecutors that I had checked
and a client was in a position to fulfill certain promises, the
prosecutors would believe me. That is why my arguments at
sentencing meant something to the court. The ability to trust the
lawyer's statement is important for clients, lawyers, and judges alike.
A desire to maintain that ability to trust also causes most lawyers and
judges to avoid abusing their relationships by asking questions of the
sort the judge in Freedman's hypothetical asks; they know such
questions improperly try to force a breach of confidentiality.
Thus far, I have suggested that lawyers play multiple roles in the
system. They have some obligation to the keep the institutions of the
system working properly. And the obligation of truth-telling is
efficient and helpful to those institutions.
But now we come to perhaps the most important consideration that
is missing in Freedman's analysis. Legal ethics-the codes and other
constraints on lawyer behavior-encompass not just multiple roles for
lawyers, but also many values other than client and systemic interests.
Consider, for example, exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality,
such as the old code's permission to disclose client confidences to
prevent crimes 52 and the new code's permission to disclose to prevent
harm.53 These exceptions are based on third-party interests that trump
52 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1969).
53 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.6(b)(1H3) (2007).
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the principle of zeal.54 Similarly, ethics code provisions that
encourage lawyers to discuss moral and political considerations in
advising clients recognize independent goods. Prohibitions against
lying and dishonesty are based on general moral precepts.
There are different kinds of integrity rules.56 One set essentially
reminds lawyers that their activities are bounded not only by ethics
codes, but also external constraints. Lawyers, for example, are subject
to criminal law, so code provisions that say lawyers may not assist a
client in committing criminal conduct and may reveal confidences to
prevent crime make it clear to lawyers that they should not overdo the
commitment to zeal. The second set of integrity rules do not
necessarily correspond to external law, but rather correspond to
general moral principles that bind everyone, including lawyers. The
principles may not be absolute, any more than moral principles are
absolute for non-lawyers. Nevertheless, the lawyer codes recognize
that there are some general principles for behavior that lawyers
should ordinarily adhere to, even when that contradicts the ethic of
zeal.
For example, lawyers are told they may not mislead unrepresented
third parties.57 Lawyers are enjoined not to harass third parties for the
client's benefit. 58 Model Rule 8.4 contains a series of provisions
forbidding lawyers to engage in deceit and other dishonest acts.59
These and other provisions clarify that the lawyer's role does not
automatically require lawyers to cede common courtesy, civility, and
moral behavior on the basis of their obligation to champion their
clients' interests. Ethical boundaries relating to personal and
professional conduct co-exist with the rules of role.
This is not the time or place to get into the details of these rules. It
is enough for our purposes to note that a range of ethics rules exist
that encourage well-intentioned lawyers to honor moral values and
inform them that they cannot resolve all dilemmas with single-minded
54 See Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1397
(2004) ("All American jurisdictions recognize that society's need to prevent particular kinds of
client conduct sometimes trumps the client's interests in confidentiality and his lawyer's
loyalty.").
55 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007) (requiring lawyers to exercise
"independent professional judgment" and allowing lawyers rendering advice to "refer not only
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors").
56 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics (discussing ethics provisions that
implement general moral principles) (forthcoming; on file with author); cf Stier, supra note 15,
at 565-67 (discussing rules that encourage lawyers to exercise moral discretion).
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4 (2007).
s Id. R. 4.4(a).
9 Id. R. 8.4.
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devotion to the advocate's ethic. Lawyers must consider how the
system needs them to act, but they also must consider universal
principles of integrity-including the principle that lawyers, like
everyone else, ordinarily should not lie.
So back to our lawyer confronting the judge who has asked him
whether the client is guilty. How should he act? It is not enough to
conclude, as Freedman does, that lying helps the client. Nor does the
fact that the judge acted improperly resolve the issue: why, exactly,
should two wrongs make a right?
The lawyer needs to balance a series of partially conflicting
values: loyalty to the client; systemic interests in reassuring all clients
that lawyers will act in their interests; systemic interests in having
clients, lawyers, and judges be able to trust the lawyer's word;
Professor Lawry's obligation to "the processes, procedures, and
institutions" of the law; lawyers' personal interests in not telling lies
simply for pragmatic ends; and universal ethical principles.
Freedman's proposed lie serves only the first two values-loyalty
and ensuring that clients will trust lawyers to act in their interests.
Telling the truth serves only the last two values-preserving the
lawyer's integrity and acting consistently with the general ethic
against lying-as well as some aspects of the obligation to legal
institutions; telling the truth serves the efficiency of judicial
administration but not necessarily the client-centered core of the
adversary process.
That brings us back to the third option, which begins to appear
more appealing: informing the judge, politely, that the question is
inappropriate-undermining confidentiality and the lawyer's role-
and that you, the lawyer, will not answer the question for reasons of
principle. This enables the lawyer to tell the truth and preserves the
system as it is intended to operate. If it is the right answer to give, it
also is an answer that is loyal to the client, in the same way that
refusing to suborn perjury is consistent with loyalty. The client may
not like it, but constraints on loyalty are part of the rules of the game.
The client cannot expect representation to mean that his lawyer will
dishonor legal limits on client advocacy.
But that answer, again, is too simple and glib. Because I have
ignored the innocent client-the one who would be helped by the
honest response that "my client did not do it," in the same way that
my own clients sometimes were helped by my conversations with
prosecutors vouching for them. Within the concept of loyalty, do
these clients not have a right to expect the giving of a truthful answer
that will serve their cause? If their lawyers insist on telling the judge
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"the question is inappropriate and I will not answer it," are the
lawyers now not throwing the innocent clients under the bus in favor
of the guilty ones?
There is an answer, and it lies in the words of Professor Lawry that
I quoted before. But I am not sure I am comfortable with the solution,
nor am I sure that Lawry himself would apply his words to this
situation. Yet here is what I glean from his observations. If the
lawyer's first obligation truly is to the processes and institutions of
the legal system, and if the lawyer "is the client's champion only
within that realm," then the duty to serve the interest of the innocent
client by volunteering the truth is trumped. For the system's sake, the
lawyer must make sure that lawyers both speak accurately and that
judges do not undermine confidentiality and the advocate's role by
asking the inappropriate question. Once lawyers universally decline to
answer the question, judges will see no further point to the inquiry.
Ergo, the innocent client's interest must be subordinated to the legal
system's interest in preventing judges from destroying the system.
Interestingly, though Professor Freedman no doubt would be
horrified by this response, I think that his approach of lying ultimately
reaches exactly the same result. If lawyers always answer "my client
is innocent" for both guilty and innocent clients, then the judges
asking the question will soon get tired of the answer and will stop
asking the inappropriate question. The downside to Freedman's
method of reaching this outcome is that, in the process, the lying
lawyer also will have undermined everyone's ability to trust his
word-including, incidentally, the client who has observed the lawyer
lie.6
0
Having offered this proposal, I have to confess to a crisis of
conscience. Was I acting improperly as a defense attorney when I
vouched for my worthy clients to prosecutors in plea bargaining or
judges at sentencing?
Here is my thought on that. Under the professional rules and
common law in most jurisdictions, lawyers are forbidden to vouch for
their clients at trial. 61 They may not, for example, express their
personal opinion about a case to a jury in closing argument; however
strongly lawyers may attempt to persuade the jury of the client's
60 See infra text accompanying note 76.
61 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (e) (2007) (forbidding lawyers to
"state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused"). For a discussion of vouching and its
costs, see generally Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of
Lawyer Speech, 69 So. CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1665-66, 1668-75 (1996).
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innocence, they may not say, "I believe my client did not commit the
crime." The main reason for this principle is the one I have already
mentioned. If lawyers were allowed to vouch, but forbidden to lie for
guilty clients, savvy jurors would be able to tell from lawyers'
arguments which clients deserve to be convicted. In the end, the
regulators have concluded that lawyers should follow basic principles
of integrity by not lying for guilty clients, but at the same time should
not throw the guilty clients under the bus by vouching for the
innocent.
So is the situation any different when a lawyer vouches for a client
in plea bargaining or at sentencing? Perhaps a bit. That is because, as
a practical matter, prosecutors assume that all defendants are guilty
and unworthy. For the most part, this is the legitimate starting point
for judges at the point of sentencing as well. 62 The guilty defendant,
or the one who the lawyer believes cannot comply with unusual
conditions of diversion or probation, is not put into a worse position
when the lawyer fails to extol her non-existent virtues; she will be
treated fairly in the world assumed by the prosecutor and judge. In
contrast, the innocent or capable defendant will be treated unfairly if
the lawyer remains silent and fails to contradict the prosecutor's or
the judge's assumption that the defendant is unworthy.
In one sense, this approach treats clients unequally. If extended too
far, it might even be unconstitutional, because every defendant is
entitled to aggressive counsel. But the reality is that aggressiveness
takes many forms. Lawyers can never do the exact same thing for
each client. What they can accomplish is limited both by the client's
factual situation and by the rules governing the lawyer's behavior.
The good defense lawyer is not the one who vouches for every client
equally regardless of whether the situation calls for it, but the one
who always tries to maximize the client's rights and interests given
the systemic constraints on what the lawyer can and may do.63
Integrity rules-such as the prohibition against lying-are part of
those constraints.
Nevertheless, I still do not feel sanguine about where my
discussion has led, because it seems so counter-intuitive that a lawyer
62 After conviction, the presumption of innocence disappears. Judges thus assume a
different posture towards defendants, for example in setting bail conditions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143 (a)-(b) (2000) (providing presumptions that convicted defendants be detained without
bail pending sentencing and appeals).
63 See Fred C. Zacharias, Five Lessons for Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2002) ("a lawyer should strive to do at least one thing to
improve the lot of each client that other lawyers might not do.").
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should avoid informing a judge, truthfully, that his client is innocent.
Yet the only other truthful response-actually saying "my client is
innocent" to the judge at the pre-trial stage-presents exactly the
same danger as vouching in closing arguments. Pre-trial, judges (like
jurors) are still supposed to be presuming innocence for all clients.
When the hypothetical judge inquires about the defendant's
culpability, there is nothing wrong with pointing to evidence
supporting the client's innocence or reminding the judge of the
presumption of innocence. However, because her question is designed
to eliminate the presumption for guilty defendants, the lawyer should
not be a party to making the question effective. The duty to preserve
the system seems to require a response that hurts the lawyers'
innocent clients in the same way as refraining from vouching in
summations.64
One attraction of the so-called Brougham principle is that it
simplifies lawyers' lives.65 If a lawyer's ethic of zeal requires "entire
devotion to the client"-meaning that all considerations must give
way before this "entire devotion"-then the lawyer does not need to
balance, accommodate, or choose among competing values. Nor does
the lawyer need to contextualize; he can follow the same exclusive
principle in giving advice, negotiating, and engaging in cooperative
transactions. The lawyer's life is not that simple, however, and the
64 Assuming that the innocent client is not entitled to an assertion of her innocence by a
truthful lawyer, would the innocent client prefer Professor Freedman's approach-having an
untruthful lawyer say all clients are innocent-to the truthful non-responsive answer? On an
extremely short-term view-that is, resolving the issue as if the lawyer appears before the judge
only one time and has not yet appeared on behalf of a series of clients-perhaps so. In that
unlikely scenario, the judge might believe the (untruthful) lawyer or at least would not be able to
draw any inference of this client's guilt. In the more realistic situation in which the lawyer has
repeat business before the judge, however, the innocent client is worse off because she will want
to rely on the lawyer's credibility in future appearances. The lawyer's practice of lying
undermines that credibility.
Moreover, if the client is not the lawyer's first, her case may be the straw within the series
of innocence protestations that breaks the proverbial camel's back. At some point, the court will
tire of the protestations and become especially likely to assume that the defendant before the
court is guilty. The innocent client is just as likely to be the unfortunate victim of this reality as
the lawyer's other, guilty clients. On balance, therefore, an innocent client with a lawyer who
has (and knows) other clients or with a lawyer who will make future appearances is safer being
represented by someone who declines to answer the culpability question on the explicit basis of
principle.
65 There is some dispute about what Lord Brougham himself actually meant by his
prescription. Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1213 (2006) with Zacharias & Green, supra note 28. There is no doubt,
however, that in modem times Brougham's statement has been treated as the personification of
the adversarial ideal. Cf generally Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial
Ethics: Text, Subtext, and Context, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29 (1991) (debating the modem
significance of the Brougham approach).
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legal ethics standards, including judicial regulation, have never
treated it as simple.
Professor Freedman seems to recognize as much. In trying to
justify a departure from the unambiguous ethics rules that forbid
lawyers to lie, he states "there are moral and ethical considerations
beyond the rules themselves that should inform the lawyer's
professional conduct. ' ' 66 This frees Freedman to refer to a series of
biblical illustrations which suggest that, under some circumstances, a
lie can be morally justified. That relatively uncontroversial conclusion
should have left Freedman in the same quandary I find myself-with
the task of accommodating the conflicting values and considerations
that affect lawyers. It should have left him with an answer, whatever
it might be, that feels unsettling and unsatisfying.
Unfortunately, Freedman jumps from the conclusion that lying by
lawyers sometimes might be justifiable back to the comfort zone of
the simple, single ethic. Lying by the hypothetical lawyer is, for
Freedman, "a form of morally justifiable equivocation." 67 "It is
technically accurate," Freedman asserts, "because the client is
presumed to be innocent., 68 The lawyer owes his client devotion and
therefore should tell the lie-that-is-no-lie.
With all due respect, I cannot agree that this syllogism is an
exercise in "moral philosophy., 69 To the contrary, it looks like word-
play that avoids the very issue that Professor Freedman has done us
the favor of presenting. 70  Freedman's assumption that the
Constitution mandates his view is equally tautological. 7' The
Constitution is not clear on what the guarantees of effective assistance
of counsel, due process, and the privilege against self-incrimination
entail. The extent of the protections depends on what the system
requires; they do not themselves define a single role for lawyers
within the system. In the end, by relying on his exclusive paradigm of
6 Freedman, supra note 12, at 775.
67 Id at 777.
Sid.
69 Freedman suggests that resort to moral philosophy supports his position, but his
references to moral philosophers are mostly limited to St. Augustine and biblical texts. Id. at
782.
70 See supra note 25.
71 Freedman, supra note 12, at 773 (relying on the constitution to establish the lawyer's
role). In the particular context of the lawyer's response to the judge's question about his client's
guilt, Freedman's self-incrimination argument has some force, because the Fifth Amendment
does seem hostile to the compelled revelation of the client's admission. See Monroe H.
Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 133, 152-61 (2008)
(spelling out the self-incrimination argument in the client perjury context). That conclusion,
however, does not militate in favor of lying by the lawyer so much as his refusal to answer the
judge's question.
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the lawyer's functions, Freedman obviates serious consideration of
how the lawyer should accommodate the various roles that ethics
codes and judicial regulators have always recognized.
Let me digress for a moment from the narrow focus of how lying
fits legal ethics regulation and consider the issue of lawyers and lying
more broadly. I mentioned "moral philosophy" earlier because that is
a source that Professor Freedman suggests should inform the debate.
The question of when it is appropriate to lie is not a new one for
moral philosophers. Indeed, it has been the subject of books.72
In her most famous work, Sissela Bok-a Swedish philosopher
who also happened to marry a dean of the Harvard Law School73 -
considered lying from a myriad of different angles.74 One of her
approaches was to look at how lying affects the various actors
involved in the lie-the recipient of the lie, the person who may be
harmed or helped by it, and the liar himself. It is worth considering
those perspectives here.
We have considered the system's interest in truth-telling by
lawyers. But what about the interests of the individual judge? Sooner
or later she will suspect that the lawyer has lied, particularly when the
lawyer tells her in case after case that his client is innocent. At this
point, the judge will not only distrust this lawyer, but likely other
lawyers as well-and not only in the narrow context of the guilt-
innocence question. When the lawyer tells the judge that his client -
perhaps the very client the judge has asked about-is not a flight risk,
cannot post bail, is willing to enter a rehabilitation facility, or has no
criminal record, the judge will not believe a word the lawyer says. In
Bok's terms, "we, when lied to, have no way to judge which lies are
the trivial ones. 75 She concludes, from the perspective of the person
deceived, that "[t]here must be a minimal degree of trust in
communication for language and action to be more than stabs in the
dark. This is why some minimal level of truthfulness has always been
seen as essential to human society, no matter how deficient the
observance of other moral principles."76
Then there is the client who has watched the lawyer declare her
innocence, knowing that she has told the lawyer she is guilty as sin.
72 See, e.g., BOK, supra note 32; SISSELA BOK, SECRETS ON ETHICs OF CONCEALMENT
AND REVELATION 6 (1982) (distinguishing lying from concealing secret information)
73 See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SisselaBok (last visited on September 7,
2007.
74 See generally BOK, supra note 32.
71 Id. at 21.
76 Id. at 18.
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The client certainly will be grateful to the lawyer who knows no one
but the client. But will she trust the lawyer in the future-which is
after all the goal of convincing the client that the lawyer is her ally?
Perhaps not. The lawyer has lied to the judge's face. He may lie to the
client too.
What's more, the lawyer has made it clear to the client that lying
to the court is part of the game. Obviously criminal defendants
already have incentives to lie themselves-in testimony, sentencing,
or to their probation officers. But society does harbor the hope that
sometimes they will be honest, particularly having taken an oath to
tell the truth. Why should they, however, after their lawyers make it
clear that truth-telling is discretionary?
The most important perspective that I have not yet mentioned is
that of the lying lawyer himself. As a criminal defense attorney, he
can perhaps be proud that he has vindicated Brougham's ideal. But
not so proud that he will tell his mother the story over tea. As Bok
puts it, "Liars usually weigh only the immediate harm to others from
the lie against the benefits they want to achieve. The flaw in such an
outlook is that it ignores or underestimates two additional kinds of
harm-the harm that lying does to the liars themselves and the harm
done to the general level of trust and social cooperation.",
77
Lying comes at a personal cost not only to how the lawyer must
think of himself, but also to his sense of being part of the community.
He cannot help but feel isolated. The only ones who will understand
him-even if he acted correctly-are other lawyers. As Bok says, "A
liar often does diminish himself by lying, and the loss is precisely to
his dignity, his integrity. 78
Moreover, there is the slippery slope. Bok asks us to consider this:
"if lawyers become used to accepting certain lies, how will this affect
their integrity in other areas? '79 She suggests that the risks of harm
arising from lying are increased by "the fact that so few lies are
solitary ones."8°
If lying is appropriate in the hypothetical, in what other
circumstances does the adversarial ethic mandate it? Professor
Freedman suggests negotiations and settlement conferences, on the
theory that judges and adversaries expect lawyers to puff and that
negotiating conventions anticipate deceit. 81 But there is a flaw in that
7 Id. at 24.
" Id. at 46.
'9 Id. at 163.
go BOK, supra note 32, at 25.
8' Freedman, supra note 12, at 780-81.
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reasoning. Client-oriented advocacy at trial is justified mainly on the
theory that the competition between advocates is overseen by neutral
fact-finders who sift the conflicting arguments, identify
misstatements, and impose an appropriate result. There are no similar
safeguards for good results when lawyers lie in negotiations. Here, as
elsewhere, if conventions and client-orientation is all that guides
lawyers, lawyers really cannot know whether lying is morally
justified. And Bok suggests that "after the first lies ...others can
come more easily. Psychological barriers wear down; lies seem more
necessary, less reprehensible.,
82
The personal and psychological perspectives of the actors just
discussed all militate against allowing lying in our hypothetical. It is,
again, only when we consider the one remaining actor that the issue
becomes complicated-the innocent defendant. From his perspective
too, lying is bad; the lawyer's willingness to lie in general would have
a negative effect on this client. But that is because the innocent client,
with justification, wants the benefit of having a lawyer who can tell
the truth and will be believed.
If we accept the position that I have tentatively proposed-that the
lawyer should decline to answer the judge's question regarding
innocence-this client is harmed not by a lie, but by the lawyer's
failure to volunteer the whole truth. Psychologically, this client may
trust the lawyer less in the future and certainly will have less faith in
the justice system. Whether the lawyer can explain his rationale-the
obligation to keep the system functioning well for all clients, guilty
and innocent alike-is a challenge to the lawyer's persuasiveness.
So even the counsel of philosophers, like Bok, does not lead to an
easy solution to our hypothetical. Yet moral philosophy can help us
understand the consequences of lying in a way that resort to a simple
rule or adversarial ethic cannot. Bok resolves her own attitude toward
the complex issues like this:
[T]rust in some degree of veracity functions as a foundation
of relations among human beings; when this trust shatters or
wears away, institutions collapse .... Such a principle need
not indicate that all lies should be ruled out .... But it does
make at least one immediate limitation on lying: in any
situation where a lie is a possible choice, one must first seek
truthful alternatives.8 3
82 BOK, supra note 32, at 25.
8' Id. at 31.
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That is what I have tried to do.
In my remarks, I have taken the name of our wise man in vain
several times. I hope that I have not mischaracterized his views. I do
not know how Professor Lawry would resolve the specific issue that I
have addressed. But I am fairly certain of this: he would not consider
the question one that can be resolved mechanically.
Commenting upon the public's attitude toward lawyers, Professor
Lawry had this to say: "[In popular literature], the lawyer's role as
advocate is similar to that of the lone gunfighter who, against all
odds, restores peace and establishes justice by slaying the forces of
evil. Reality is more complex and far less dramatic than that."
84
Lawry noted further that "the system itself is designed to have
lawyers perform a variety of tasks for a variety of clients in a variety
of settings. The ethical responsibilities of lawyers change depending
on the type of task, the client, and the setting.
85
Professor Lawry, in his career, never tried to answer all the hard
questions that lawyers might face. To my knowledge, he never
considered the lying issue that I have discussed today.86 But I think he
might share my instinct that discarding the lawyer's obligation of
candor in favor of the ethic of zeal has serious costs for the institution
of the law. Professor Lawry wrote: "the lawyer's primary obligation
to the legal system is an affirmative one; it is not another way of
saying the lawyer's obligation is to the client as prescribed by the
law. 87 He also said, "I believe that if lawyers were more committed
to their primary obligation of playing by the rules, many of the major
problems of distortion would be eliminated .... if lawyers made it a
practice to play 'tough but fair,' I believe the best traditions would be
revitalized."'88
Earlier, I identified the various "camps" within the field of
professional responsibility. Much of what scholars in each of those
camps focus on is justifying ways lawyers should act within the
adversary system. The hypothetical I have discussed is a specific
illustration of how the debate may play out. Freedman, assuming
Brougham's ethic is controlling, suggests a prescription for how
lawyers should deal with a rule that forbids lying. The Hoffman camp
84 Lawry, supra note 1, at 336-37.
85 Id. at 336.
86 He has, however, considered related subjects, at times challenging Professor
Freedman's ultra-adversarial approach to legal ethics. See, e.g., Robert P. Lawry, Lying,
Confidentiality, and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653, 654 (arguing that
"no lawyer may allow a [client's] lie to corrupt the adversary system").
87 Lawry, supra note 1, at 336.
88 Id. at 344.
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might suggest that lawyers be guided by their personal consciences,
or other case-specific moral considerations bearing on when lying is
appropriate. 89 I have suggested an approach that also is contextual,
but which identifies competing values in the legal ethics codes and
addresses the conflicting institutional interests that need to be
accommodated.
Although the hypothetical is, I think, an interesting intellectual
exercise, I doubt that the specific issue it raises has enduring
significance. All participants in the system usually understand their
core functions and avoid putting the other participants in situations
that undermine their functions. Judges, in other words, are unlikely to
ask the question the hypothetical posits. If they do, judges will
quickly take the hint that it is unreasonable.
The intellectual exercise itself, however, has some importance
because it highlights the different ways one might think about the
lawyer's role, or roles. I have suggested that lawyers have multiple
functions, and conflicting obligations, that cannot be resolved simply,
by resort to a single paradigm. Professor Lawry, again, had it right
when he said "'reform' or 'modification' of lawyers' ethics within the
adversary system is a secondary challenge to the task of getting the
central idea of lawyering straight to begin with."90
89 William Simon, for example, has suggested that "[p]opular and professional moralists
have a tendency to over-condemn lying." William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of
Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 433, 433 (1999). Simon concludes,
partly in conflict with Bok, that "[i]n situations where honesty conflicts with other important
values, there is no reason to presume that honesty should prevail." Id. at 463.
90 Lawry, supra note 1, at 363.
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